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Christopher J. O’Leary
Unemployment after 
Welfare Reform
The Personal Responsibility and 
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) of 1996 changed welfare 
in the United States by establishing 
Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF). This law introduced 
lifetime limits and work requirements 
for continued TANF benefit eligibility. 
With employment the key to making 
TANF work, two public employment 
programs are expected to help maintain 
labor force participation during periods 
of joblessness: unemployment insurance 
(UI), which provides temporary partial 
wage replacement to the involuntarily 
unemployed, and the Employment 
Service (ES), which provides job-
matching services for job seekers and 
employers. 
The Upjohn Institute recently 
evaluated the use of UI and ES 
by recent TANF leavers, based on 
program administrative data from four 
of the nine largest states ranked by 
population size (O’Leary and Kline 
2008, forthcoming). We examined the 
incidence of unemployment and the rates 
of UI application, eligibility, and benefit 
receipt. We also studied the correlation 
between UI receipt, ES participation, and 
self-sufficiency for recent TANF leavers. 
Characteristics of Unemployed  
TANF Leavers
Our study used administrative data 
from Florida, Georgia, Michigan, 
and Ohio. Panels were constructed 
based on all adult TANF leavers in the 
administrative data during time frames 
that varied somewhat across the states. 
Data from all four states included the 
year 2000, however. The panels were 
constructed to have at least 12 calendar 
quarters of data after TANF exit to 
observe UI and ES program use and labor 
market transitions. The data for analysis 
included of a total of 322,036 adults 
leaving TANF for employment. 
Among TANF leavers in the four-
state pooled sample, 253,189 (79 
percent) experienced a new spell of 
unemployment within three years. The 
demographic characteristics of the 
UI applicants among the unemployed 
included 34 percent youths (18–24) and 
58 percent prime-age persons (25–44); 
82 percent females; 37 percent whites, 60 
percent African Americans, and 2 percent 
Hispanics. In nominal dollars, quarterly 
earnings among all newly unemployed 
TANF leavers averaged over the three 
years before TANF exit were $1,414, and 
average quarterly earnings from TANF 
exit to the new spell of unemployment 
were $1,772. 
UI Application
In times of normal labor market 
conditions, the UI application rate for 
Americans ranges between two-thirds 
and three-quarters of all the jobless. 
Among the 253,189 newly unemployed 
TANF leavers in the pooled four-state 
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sample, 61,458 applied for UI, yielding 
a mean UI application rate in the pooled 
sample of 24 percent. That means less 
than one-quarter of all newly unemployed 
TANF leavers applied for UI benefits. 
Compared to nonapplicants, TANF 
leavers who applied for UI included 
higher proportions of people who are 
prime aged, are African American, 
have dependent children, have higher 
earnings before UI application, have 
more prior work experience, and have 
prior employment in construction, 
manufacturing, wholesale trade, or 
administration.1 Higher UI application 
rates were also observed in areas with 
higher or faster-rising unemployment. 
The more than 75 percent of newly 
unemployed TANF leavers who failed 
to apply for UI were more likely 
to be young and white, and to have 
lower earnings before a new spell of 
unemployment, fewer calendar quarters 
with employment before TANF exit, and 
recent prior employment in the industries 
of retail trade, educational service, health 
care, or hospitality. 
UI Eligibility
Unemployment insurance eligibility 
rules ensure that beneficiaries are 
strongly attached to the labor force and 
are temporarily jobless involuntarily 
and through no fault of their own. 
To initially qualify for UI, a claimant 
must have sufficient prior earnings and 
employment—these are called monetary 
eligibility conditions. For the year 2000, 
base-period earnings requirements in the 
four states ranged from $1,872 in Georgia 
to $3,400 in Florida. Nonmonetary 
eligibility rules prohibit quits and 
discharge for misconduct or other causes 
justifiable by an employer. Employer 
discharge for cause is usually related to 
frequent tardiness, unexplained absences, 
misconduct, or poor job performance. 
For the year 2000, base-period earnings 
requirements in the four states studied 
ranged from $1,872 in Georgia to $3,400 
in Florida. Table 1 compares results from 
our study to evidence from previous 
research. 
Among TANF leavers who became 
newly unemployed and applied for UI 
benefits, 87 percent were initially eligible 
for UI based on monetary requirements 
in the four-state pooled data. Those 
meeting monetary eligibility conditions 
were more likely to be male, prime aged, 
highly educated, have prior employment 
in the industries of wholesale trade and 
real estate, and less likely to have been 
employed in retail trade. Previous studies 
estimate monetary eligibility in the range 
of 75–90 percent (Table 1).
The rate of nonmonetary eligibility 
was estimated to be 44 percent. Among 
newly unemployed TANF leavers who 
applied for UI benefits, those meeting 
nonmonetary eligibility requirements 
had larger sample proportions of males, 
Hispanics, and those with higher 
educational attainment. For TANF 
leavers, higher rates of voluntary job 
quits and employer justified dismissals 
resulted in lower rates of nonmonetary 
eligibility. Among newly unemployed 
TANF leavers who applied for UI, 17 
percent quit their prior jobs while 33 
percent were fired. Within these groups, 
those who quit had larger sample 
proportions of females; whites; members 
of the industry groups retail trade, hotels 
and restaurants, and health care; and 
members of services occupations. Those 
who were discharged were more likely to 
be young, female, and African American, 
and to have had prior employment in 
the industries of retail trade; finance, 
insurance, and real estate; health care; 
and hotels and restaurants. Previous 
studies estimate nonmonetary eligibility 
in the range of 25–40 percent (Table 1). 
These studies also cite voluntary quits 
and employer discharges as likely reasons 
for failure of nonmonetary eligibility 
rules.
UI Benefit Receipt
Among TANF leavers who were UI 
applicants in the sample pooled across 
four states, the proportion receiving 
UI benefits was 50 percent. This rate 
is higher than the overall nonmonetary 
eligibility rate because benefit denials 
can be appealed and the periods of 
entitlement suspension are limited. In 
these four states denial penalties range 
from 6 to 17 weeks in a 52-week benefit 
year. Among TANF leavers who qualified 
for UI, mean weekly benefit amounts 
were $159, mean entitled durations 
of UI benefits were 19.6 weeks, and 
on average 74.6 percent of entitled UI 
benefits were drawn. Mean UI payments 
were $2,442 over the full benefit year, 
or a mean of 14.5 weeks of UI at the 
average weekly benefit amount for this 
sample. Benefit entitlements were fully 
exhausted by 53 percent of TANF-leaver 
UI beneficiaries, which is a higher rate 
of UI benefit exhaustion than among UI 
beneficiaries not recently involved with 
TANF in the same time frame. TANF 
leaver UI beneficiaries are more likey to 
be older, male, white, and Hispanic, with 
higher proportions from the construction 
and manufacturing industries and 
smaller proportions from the retail trade, 
health care, and hospitality industries. 
By occupation, UI recipients included 
higher proportions from management, 
professional, and production occupations 
and smaller proportions from service 
occupations. A previous study of New 
Jersey welfare leavers estimated a 
beneficiary rate of 56 percent among UI 
applicants (Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, 
and Corson 2002). 
UI and Self-Sufficiency
A goal of UI as social insurance is to 
prevent descent into poverty by those 
who are temporarily jobless through 
no fault of their own. We examine self-
sufficiency in the sense of return to 
employment and independence from 
TANF cash assistance. Of the 241,719 
newly unemployed TANF leavers in 
the four-state pooled sample, those 
who received UI benefits returned to 
employment at a slightly higher rate than 
those who did not receive benefits (74 
percent versus 73 percent). Furthermore, 
UI beneficiaries returned to TANF at 
a significantly lower rate (30 percent) 
Our data suggest that 
application for UI is a 
pathway to reemployment 
services, even if cash UI 
benefits are not forthcoming
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than did nonbeneficiaries (45 percent). 
Among TANF leavers who applied for 
UI benefits, controlling for observable 
characteristics in econometric models, 
those who received UI returned to 
employment at a rate higher by 4.8 
percentage points and returned to TANF 
at a rate lower by 10.5 percentage points.
Use of the Employment Service
One-stop career centers operating 
under the Workforce Investment Act 
deliver reemployment services divided 
into three increasing levels of service: 
core, intensive, and training. Core and 
intensive services at one-stops are often 
delivered by the ES with Wagner-Peyser 
Act funding. Participants typically use 
core services before progressing to 
intensive or training services. Using 
data from Georgia, we examined the 
use of Wagner-Peyser Act–funded ES 
services by newly unemployed TANF 
leavers and measured the correlations 
between ES usage and labor market 
outcomes, controlling for the degree of 
UI involvement.
The data show that large proportions 
of newly unemployed TANF leavers used 
the ES. Among these, sizable numbers 
of UI nonapplicants used ES services, 
but usage rates were significantly higher 
among UI applicants. Importantly, ES 
usage rates were similar between UI 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiary UI 
applicants, suggesting that application 
for UI is a pathway to reemployment 
services provided by the ES, even if 
cash UI benefits are not forthcoming. 
The usage of ES by all Georgia residents 
who left TANF between the second 
quarter of 1996 and the fourth quarter 
of 2001 is summarized in Figure 1. 
Service use was examined from one 
quarter before through one quarter after 
TANF exit, new unemployment, and 
application for UI. The ES was used 
by 21 percent of all the 152,278 TANF 
leavers in Georgia, including 26 percent 
of the 123,424 who experienced a new 
spell of unemployment after TANF 
exit. Among the newly unemployed, 76 
percent of the 27,166 who applied for UI 
benefits and 14 percent of the 96,254 UI 
nonapplicants used ES. Among the UI 
applicants, 78 percent of the 13,335 UI 
beneficiaries and 77 percent of the 15,295 
ineligible UI applicants used ES. While 
usage rates were lower across the board 
for intensive services, a similar pattern 
of usage can be seen across the UI usage 
groups. A key contrast is the substantially 
higher rate of usage for both core and 
intensive services by ineligible UI 
applicants compared to UI nonapplicants.
Employment Services and  
Self-Sufficiency
For our samples of newly unemployed 
TANF leavers in Georgia, econometric 
models controlling for UI receipt and 
observable characteristics suggest that ES 
use helps to maintain connections with 
employment opportunities, particularly 
for the working poor. This appears 
to be true regardless of the degree 
of involvement with UI and, despite 
the fact that UI applicants use the ES 
more often, this result still holds for 
UI nonapplicants. Additionally there is 
evidence that use of services through 
the ES reduces rates of complete TANF 
dependency and inactivity. 
Before this study, there has been no 
research on ES use by TANF leavers 
in the United States. However, a recent 
Canadian field experiment found that 
while financial incentives alone did 
Table 1  Survey of Estimates for Welfare Leavers of Percentage Rates for UI Eligibility and Benefit Receipt
Authors Samples
Monetarily
UI eligible
Nonmonetarily 
UI eligible
Beneficiary
of UI
Gustafson and Levine (1997) National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Data from 1979 to 1994 
on 43,913 job separations, including 4,213 by AFDC leavers. 
Up to 85 About 25 About 10
Vroman (1998) Data for 1996 UI state wage and earnings, state UI recipiency 
and eligibility rates, for part-time minimum wage jobs. 
— — Up to 20
Holzer (2000) Data on 1997–1999 employment and earnings of hired welfare 
recipients in a survey of 3,000 employers in four large American 
cities.
— — Under 30
Kaye (2001) Survey of Program Dynamics data for the year 2000 on 56,000 
persons. Simulated UI eligibility for those at risk of welfare 
receipt.
81 36 25
Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto, 
and Corson (2002) 
New Jersey data from the Work First NJ evaluation tracking 
2,000 TANF beneficiaries in the 18 months starting July 1997.
75 40 56
Rangarajan and  
Razafindrakoto (2004)
National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work grants in 5 
metropolitan counties. TANF leavers, September 1999 to 
August 2000. Metro sample sizes from 1,000 to 15,000.
90 — —
O’Leary and Kline (2008) State program administrative data for UI, ES, and TANF 
between 1996 and 2002. State (number of calendar quarters): 
Florida (10), Georgia (23), Michigan (5), and Ohio (6). 
Combined sample size: 322,036.
87 44 50
NOTE: — = not available.
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not result in significant reductions in 
welfare dependency, when combined 
with reemployment services, the financial 
incentives yielded large and statistically 
significant reductions in rates of welfare 
receipt (Robins, Michalopolous, and 
Foley 2008).
Summary
It is undeniable that TANF changed 
welfare. Since TANF was introduced in 
1996, welfare caseloads have declined 
dramatically. While caseloads have 
nearly vanished in some states, need 
remains. Former TANF recipients and 
others vulnerable to welfare dependency 
are turning to multiple sources to replace 
cash public assistance. The roles of 
UI and ES for low-income Americans 
in a post-TANF economy should be 
better understood. The degree to which 
this population is served under current 
arrangements needs to be documented. 
We must also learn about the extent to 
which initiatives of UI modernization 
and ES revitalization under the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act broaden 
the effectiveness of these programs 
for our most vulnerable households. 
Additionally, we should identify federal 
and state program changes to make these 
institutions accessible, sustainable, and 
more compatible for employers and job 
seekers in competitive labor markets. 
In the aggregate, TANF leavers 
constitute a small and declining share 
of all UI beneficiaries. While TANF 
leavers have higher UI exhaustion rates 
than non-TANF-leaver UI beneficiaries, 
they also have significantly lower 
initial entitled UI benefit durations. The 
recent recession saw an increased share 
of UI beneficiaries from high-wage 
professional and technical occupations. 
In 2009, the number of TANF leavers 
declined to be less than 3 percent of all 
Georgia UI beneficiaries and an even 
smaller share of UI benefit payment 
costs. However, for TANF leavers who 
receive UI and ES services, these are 
lifelines to continued self-sufficiency and 
labor force attachment.
Note
1. Differences and point estimates 
discussed in this article were all estimated with 
statistical precision exceeding the 95 percent 
level of confidence in two-tailed tests.) 
References
Gustafson, Cynthia, and Phillip Levine. 
1997. “Less-Skilled Workers, Welfare 
Reform, and the Unemployment Insurance 
System.” Working paper. Berkeley: 
University of California, Berkeley. 
Holzer, Harry J. 2000. Unemployment 
Insurance and Welfare Recipients: What 
Happens When the Recession Comes? 
New Federalism: Issues and Options for 
States No. A-46. Washington, DC: The 
Urban Institute.
Kelleen. Kaye. 2001. “Re-Examining 
Unemployment Insurance as a Potential 
Safety Net for Workers at Risk of Public 
Assistance Receipt.” Prepared for the 
“America’s Workforce Network Research 
Conference,” held in Washington, DC, 
June 26–27. 
O’Leary, Christopher J., and Kenneth 
J. Kline. 2008. UI as a Safety Net for 
Former TANF Recipients. Office of 
the Assistant Secretary for Planning 
and Evaluation. Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Health and Human 
Services. 
———. Forthcoming. Use of UI and 
ES by TANF Leavers: Final Report. 
Office of Policy Development and 
Research. Washington, DC: Employment 
and Training Administration, U.S. 
Department of Labor. 
Rangarajan, Anu, and Carol 
Razafindratoko. 2004. Unemployment 
Insurance as a Potential Safety Net for 
TANF Leavers: Evidence from Five 
States: Final Report. Princeton, NJ: 
Mathematica Policy Research, Inc. 
Rangarajan, Anu, Carol 
Razafindrakoto, and Walter Corson. 2002. 
Study to Examine UI Eligibility among 
Former TANF Recipients: Evidence from 
New Jersey. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica 
Policy Research, Inc.
Robins, Philip, Charles 
Michalopolous, and Kelly Foley. 2008. 
“Are Two Carrots Better Than One? 
The Effects of Adding Employment 
Services to Financial Incentive Programs 
for Welfare Recipients.” Industrial and 
Labor Relations Review 61(3): 410–423. 
Vroman, Wayne. 1998. Effects of 
Welfare Reform on Unemployment 
Insurance. New Federalism: Issues and 
Options for States No. A-22. Washington, 
DC: The Urban Institute.
Figure 1  Usage Rates of Employment Services by TANF Leavers in Georgia, by UI 
Application Status
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
TANF leavers Newly jobless Nonapplicants UI applicants UI beneficiaries UI ineligibles
Core services Intensive services
5Employment Research APRIL 2010
Joel P. Trachtman
The Political Economy 
of International Labor 
Migration Law 
Trade specialists look at the field 
of migration and often ask, “Why are 
there so few international commitments 
to liberalize movement of workers, 
compared to the extensive commitments 
that exist to liberalize trade in goods?” 
Goods are usually single purchase events 
and do not broadly entail a continuing 
relationship between buyer and seller. 
Even services, while entailing more 
complex and durable relationships 
than a purchase of goods, are relatively 
unidimensional. Individuals, on the other 
hand, are multidimensional, and their 
movement as workers involves long-
term relationships of great complexity 
with governments and with employers. 
Migration specialists often refer to the 
aphorism attributed to the Swiss author 
Max Frisch: “We imported workers 
and got people instead” (Borjas 2007). 
People come with cultures and skills, 
and they grow up in dense familial and 
social networks. They have spouses 
and children. They need education, 
health care, political engagement, and 
all of the other fruits of society. They 
bear responsibilities to society as well, 
including taxes and perhaps military 
service. So, as we discuss migration, we 
must recognize that it requires breaking 
and restructuring many relationships: 
a costly endeavor in the deepest sense. 
Yet despite these costs, large numbers of 
people today seem eager to move. 
However, there are substantial 
barriers in place to prevent these people 
from achieving their desires to move 
in order to seek a better life. These 
barriers demean human welfare. So it 
seems worthwhile to grapple with the 
complexity in order to evaluate whether 
and how to unlock substantial welfare 
gains. Individuals will only decide to 
undertake migration if they perceive that 
it is worthwhile to them. Throughout 
history, some have decided to do so, 
while many others have not. But we must 
also recognize that there are costs and 
benefits that are external to the individual 
migrant. The migrant may be permitted 
to decide whether to accept these costs 
and benefits for his or her own family, 
but what about costs and benefits of the 
migrant’s decision that are felt by the 
migrant’s former compatriots, or by the 
migrant’s new hosts? 
The role of international law, in 
this as in other contexts, is to allow 
states to constrain themselves where 
their unregulated action would be less 
desirable than action constrained by 
international law. International law has 
not broadly responded to state restraints 
on immigration. There are a number of 
reasons why there is little international 
law addressing such state restraints. One 
reason is that these restraints are fairly 
recent. 
The United States, which was once 
a nation of immigrants, only began to 
restrict immigration in 1875, and then 
restrictions were limited to those who 
were destitute, engaged in immoral 
activities, or physically handicapped 
(Neuman 1993, p. 1883). This restriction 
seems to be intended to protect the 
public fisc, as opposed to jobs. The 
U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
responded to concerns about competition 
from cheap immigrant labor, as well as 
racism. In fact, throughout the history 
of immigration restrictions we see the 
influence of both protectionism and 
racism. However, the late nineteenth 
century was still a period of effectively 
liberal policies toward migration. 
Roughly 60 million Europeans emigrated 
to the New World between 1820 and 
1914. This liberalism ended in the 
imposition of country-of-origin quotas 
during the early twentieth century 
(O’Rourke 2004). 
During the early twentieth century, 
many popular destination states began 
to establish restrictions on immigration. 
During the past 60 years, global society 
has made important strides toward free 
movement of goods, money, and even 
some types of services. Yet human 
migration for economic and noneconomic 
reasons remains broadly constrained. 
The book The International Law of 
Economic Migration: Toward the Fourth 
Freedom, recently published by the 
Upjohn Institute (see p. 7), explores the 
law and policy of international economic 
migration. It analyzes the economics 
and politics of migration in order to 
assess the fit between the legal rules 
and institutions that presently exist to 
govern international economic migration, 
and the goal of maximizing welfare. In 
fact, there are practically no multilateral 
international legal rules regulating 
migration for economic purposes. This 
work shows that, in order to establish 
the domestic and international political 
conditions for welfare-enhancing 
liberalization of migration, it may 
be necessary to establish binding 
international legal agreements regarding 
liberalization.
The gains from total trade 
liberalization, according to a recent 
World Bank study, are estimated at 
$155 billion annually, while the gains 
from a 3 percent increase in the stock 
of migrants is $175 billion (World Bank 
2006, p. 41). Not only does migration 
reform provide greater aggregate gains, 
but the gains are distributed more greatly 
to developing countries. No wonder 
thoughtful observers ask why economic 
migration is not on the global agenda. 
The gains from total trade 
liberalization are estimated
 at $155 billion annually, while 
the gains from a 3 percent 
increase in the stock of 
migrants is $175 billion.
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It seems reasonable to conclude that 
liberalization of migration presents the 
possibility of substantial improvement 
of global welfare, even though these are 
only estimates, with many assumptions 
and empirical gaps. However, the devil 
is in the details of the distribution of 
increased (and decreased) welfare, and 
in the political consequences of these 
distributional details. 
So, why do we see very little 
diplomatic activity toward international 
legal commitments for liberalization of 
economic migration? Why do we see 
few initiatives by states to unilaterally 
liberalize immigration, which would 
often have beneficial economic effects? 
Is the political economy story of 
international migration like the story of 
international trade, in which international 
legal commitments are useful to provide 
reciprocal incentives for exporters 
to lobby, alongside consumers, for 
lower import duties? We see a few 
regional or preferential agreements for 
liberalization—most notably, and most 
successfully, those within the EU and 
between Australia and New Zealand. We 
see almost no such agreements between 
wealthy countries and poor countries. 
Why? 
Less-skilled workers from developed 
countries will rarely wish to migrate: they 
are likely to reduce their income if they 
go to a poor country, and they cannot 
improve their income much by moving to 
a developed country. On the other hand, 
it is difficult to adapt to a new culture, 
language, and lifestyle. 
Skilled workers from developed 
countries may wish to migrate to other 
developed countries, and often this is 
permitted, although economic downturns 
seem to reduce the interest in immigrants. 
Skilled workers from developed countries 
have not sought work in developing 
countries in large numbers, presumably 
because they can earn a greater income 
in developed countries, which have more 
complementary factors to make them 
more productive. 
Skilled workers from developing 
countries often wish to migrate to 
developed countries for the same reason: 
complementary factors in wealthy 
countries would allow them to increase 
their productivity and therefore increase 
their incomes. Policies in developed 
countries vary, but until the recent 
economic crisis there were important 
initiatives to facilitate immigration of 
skilled workers. Skilled workers would 
generally be expected to increase the 
welfare of the destination state. 
Basic economic theory would 
suggest that migration of less-skilled 
workers from where they are abundant—
developing countries—to where they are 
relatively scarce—developed countries—
would increase general welfare. However, 
there are two major concerns. First, 
there is continuing debate regarding the 
extent to which less-skilled workers in 
the destination state experience reduced 
wages because of immigration of 
competing workers. Second, there is still 
some debate regarding the extent to which 
developing home states may experience 
reduced welfare due to “brain drain.” 
Remittances and return migration may 
reduce the negative effects of brain drain. 
If a multilateral framework 
agreement existed within which states 
could negotiate specific liberalization 
commitments regarding immigration, 
perhaps including reciprocal exchanges 
for liberalization in other areas such as 
investment or trade in goods or services, 
it is likely that states would more easily 
reach specific agreements that enhance 
welfare. It is also possible that enough 
enhanced welfare could be generated to 
compensate any less-skilled workers in 
the destination state who are adversely 
affected, or to compensate the home state 
for any adverse effects of brain drain. 
There are many questions that 
would be relevant to the structure of an 
international agreement providing for 
liberalization of economic migration. 
Would this agreement provide for 
nondiscrimination among home 
countries, or would it be possible for 
states to make special bilateral or 
plurilateral commitments? Should 
permission to immigrate be temporary 
or permanent? How would immigrants 
be treated in terms of local taxes, social 
security, health care, access for family 
members, and inclusion in the political 
community? These collateral issues could 
operate as inducements or deterrents to 
migration. Under what circumstances, 
such as a recession, may the destination 
state reduce its commitments? Would 
an organization be needed? Could the 
International Organization on Migration, 
the World Trade Organization, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, the International Labor 
Organization, or a new organization, best 
perform the requisite functions? 
It would be worthwhile for states to 
examine these issues, as their resolution 
could allow states to unlock great 
amounts of increased welfare, to increase 
the liberty of individuals to move, and 
to reduce global income inequality. The 
International Law of Economic Migration 
can inform this examination. 
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